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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
BRYAN J. TAVENNER, : Case No. 20070895-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Appellant Bryan Tavenner has argued on appeal that the State's evidence for 
burglary (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (2003)) and transporting/disposing of hazardous 
waste (Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-113 (2007)) is inadequate. (Br. of Appellant, dated March 
12,2008). He has raised the issues under the plain-error standard. See State v. Holgate, 
2000 UT 74,1f 13, 10 P.3d 346 (articulating plain-error standard). Now he files this reply 
brief to answer matters set forth in the State's brief. See Utah R. App. P. 24(c) (2008). 
ARGUMENT 
THE SUFFICIENCY STANDARD CONSIDERS MARSHALED 
EVIDENCE GOING TO FINDINGS AND ELEMENTS CHALLENGED ON 
APPEAL. TAVENNER HAS ADDRESSED THOSE MATTERS, WHILE 
THE STATE INJECTS OTHER INFORMATION INTO THE ANALYSIS. 
A. THE STATE HAS INJECTED IRRELEVANT INFORMATION INTO THE 
ANALYSIS: IT SEEMS TO CLAIM THAT IF DEFENDANT HAS 
PRESENTED A THEORY OR UNBELIEVABLE TESTIMONY AT TRIAL, HE 
HAS FORFEITED A SUFFICIENCY CLAIM ON APPEAL. YET A 
DEFENDANT WHO PRESENTS A TRIAL THEORY OR TESTIMONY DOES 
NOT FORFEIT THE RIGHT TO HAVE THE STATE PROVE EACH 
ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
The State seems to suggest that because Tavenner presented (i) a defense and 
arguments to the jury (see, e.g., Br. of Appellee, 17 (citing to defendant's arguments to 
the jury); id_ at 18 (referencing defendant's "strategy" with the jury); id_, 19 (stating 
defendant's strategy "below negate[s]" claims on appeal)); (ii) challenges to "trial 
evidence" (see id., 19); and (iii) conflicting, inconsistent or unbelievable statements at 
trial (see id_, 31), he has forfeited a claim on appeal going to the sufficiency of the 
evidence for the charges. (See id., 17-20, 31). That is incorrect. 
A criminal defendant does not give up the right to have the State prove its case 
simply by offering arguments to the jury, evidentiary challenges at trial, or unbelievable 
statements. The State's obligation to establish each element of an offense to support a 
conviction is inviolate: the burden of proving the defendant's guilt "remains on the state, 
whether defendant offers any evidence in an effort to prove affirmative defenses or not." 
State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^  19, 152 P.3d 315 (cite omitted); see also State v. Reyes, 
2005 UT 33, \ 11, 116 P.3d 305 (specifying the State's burden is a standard of "consti-
tutional status") (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 
508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993)); see also State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, \ 21, 52 P.3d 1210 
(stating "[a] defendant has the right to present his or her theory of the case to the jury"). 
Thus, even in a case where a defendant "strategically choos[es]" to present a 
defense theory (quoting Br. of Appellee, 20), the State is still required to present 
evidence sufficient to support each element of the offense. See. State v. Harman, 161 
P.2d 567, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating "[e]very element of the crime charged must 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt"). If the State has failed in that task and the 
2 
evidence is insufficient to support the elements, this Court may assess the issue under the 
plain-error doctrine. See, Holgate, 2000 UT 74, fflf 17-18 (articulating plain-error 
standard for sufficiency issue). 
Moreover, the matters raised by the State are irrelevant. In reviewing a 
sufficiency issue on appeal, an appellate court typically does not concern itself with (i) 
the appellant's arguments to the jury at trial; (ii) challenges to trial evidence; or (iii) the 
appellant's unbelievable statements at trial. See, e.g., Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ^ j 77, 
100 P.3d 1177 (stating an appellant raising a sufficiency issue cannot "merely re-argue 
the factual case" presented at trial); State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, f 67, 27 P.3d 1115 
(stating it is a jury function to weigh evidence and determine witness credibility; also an 
appellate court does not sit as a "second trier of fact") (citing State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, 
If 16, 25 P.3d 985); DeBrv v. Cascade Enterprises, 879 P.2d 1353, 1360 (Utah 1994) 
(rejecting appellant's attempt to "reargue evidence as if [the] appeal were a trial de 
novo"); Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting argument on appeal where it was "an attempt to reargue 
the case before this court"). 
Rather, it is concerned with whether facts and reasonable inferences exist to 
support the elements challenged on appeal. See_ State v. Gardner, 2007 UT 70, \ 24, 167 
P.3d 1074 (recognizing that an appellate court may overturn a conviction when the 
evidence is insufficient to support each element; also, when conducting the review, the 
court will look to those portions of the record containing the marshaled evidence (cites 
omitted)); see also State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989) (stating a verdict 
3 
will be upheld if there is some evidence for the elements of the crime); Harman, 767 P.2d 
at 568 (stating every element "must be proven"); State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996) (stating an appellate court will ensure "the State has introduced evidence 
sufficient to support" each element). Thus, defense counsel's arguments at trial, and 
defendant's inconsistent, conflicting trial statements are immaterial to the analysis here. 
See Gardner, 2007 UT 70, ^ 25-26 (recognizing an appellate court is not required to 
consider contradictory, conflicting evidence when reviewing a sufficiency claim on 
appeal); Mead, 2001 UT 58, f 67 (stating it is the "exclusive function of the jury" to 
weigh evidence and to determine witness credibility (emphasis in original; cite omitted)). 
B. THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS DEMONSTRATE THAT THE 
PROSECUTOR FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSES; IN ADDITION, CONTRARY TO THE 
STATE'S CLAIMS, TAVENNER MET THE MARSHALING REQUIREMENT. 
1. The State }s Arguments Demonstrate Gaps in the Evidence. 
As stated in the Brief of Appellant, Utah courts historically have required an 
appellant claiming insufficiency on appeal to fully marshal the facts and inferences going 
to the challenged element(s) for the offense. (See Br. of Appellant, 11 (citing Boyd, 2001 
UT 30,113; Harding v. Bell 2002 UT 108, If 19, 57 P.3d 1093 (stating the party 
contesting the verdict must assume the role of "devil's advocate"); West Valley City v. 
MajesticInv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (stating proper marshaling 
requires appellant to present "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant 
4 
resists. . .."))). Likewise, the appellant must "ferret out a fatal flaw" in the evidence. See 
West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1315. In the context of a criminal case, a fatal flaw exists if 
the evidence fails to support an element. See, Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ]f 13. In that instance, 
the conviction cannot be sustained. 
(a) The Burglary Count. In this case, the State charged Tavenner with burglary. 
(R. 1-3). It was required to prove that Tavenner entered or remained unlawfully "in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit" a theft or a felony offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1 )(a), (l)(b). Tavenner maintains the State failed to prove he 
entered/remained in a building. (Br. of Appellant, 17-22, 23-24, 26-27). The State does 
not seem to seriously dispute that point. (See, e.g., Br. of Appellee, 24-29 (making no 
mention of evidence for entry)). Instead it has listed the following facts and inferences 
for the offense: 
• Tavenner drove "suspiciously" to the "hospital's restricted parking lot" in the 
early morning hours on March 3 and 4, 2005, to case the area. (Br. of Appellee, 25). On 
March 4, he parked his car in the hospital parking lot and walked to an area where a 
dumpster for regular garbage and a separate shed for hazardous waste are located. (Id.) 
He took items from the area and put them in his car. (Id.) Also, he became aware of 
surveillance camera(s) in the parking lot. (Id.) 
• On March 5, Tavenner again drove to the restricted parking lot at approximately 
1:30 a.m., he parked in the lot (Br. of Appellee, 26), and he "disappeared from 
[surveillance] camera view." (Id., 7; see also id_., 5 (stating the "shed cannot be seen on 
camera")). He parked "away from the surveillance cameras as if to avoid detection," and 
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he walked around the car and then toward the dumpster and shed area in "a wide arch to 
avoid the surveillance camera." (Id., 26). 
• The hospital has two cameras at the south end. (See id., 26 n.8; State Exhibit 
35). The cameras depict the area near the garbage dumpster and separate shed. (See Br. 
of Appellee, 5-6, 26 (citing State Exhibit 35); see also infra note 3, herein). "[T]he shed 
cannot be seen on camera." (Br. of Appellee, 5). The area is "only partially visible on 
the [camera monitor] screen." (Id., 26; see also id., 28 (stating Sulieti Lutui could not see 
the shed, and citing to State Exhibit 35)). A sidewalk in the area is visible and "persons 
walking to or from the area can be seen." (Id., 5-6, 28; see also infra, note 3, herein). 
• On March 5, the cameras depicted Tavenner moving in the area "at" and 
"around" the garbage dumpster and shed. (Br. of Appellee, 27; id_ at 26). From 
approximately 1:33 to 1:39 a.m., he was seen moving in the area. (Id., 26, 27). During 
the six minute time period (1:33 to 1:39), Tavenner walked from the car to the dumpster 
and shed area three times; during two trips, he carried an item or items to the car. (Br. of 
Appellee, 27). 
• When security guard Danny Hughes arrived, Tavenner fled. (Id.) Hughes 
checked the shed and "discovered] that its lock and hinges [we]re broken." (Id:, also id., 
21). When Hughes checked the area earlier, the lock and hinges were intact. (IcL, 27) 
• Tavenner5s own statements regarding events were inconsistent and unbelievable. 
(See id., 28). The evidence supports that contrary to his claims, Tavenner was in the area 
of the dumpster and shed when the lock and hinges were damaged. (Id., 27-28). 
The State maintains that based on the above facts and inferences, the evidence 
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supports that "Defendant burglarized the shed." (IcL, 28). Yet the evidence supports only 
that over the course of 3 days (March 3, 4, 5), Tavenner drove to the hospital parking lot 
early in the morning; on March 4 and 5, he removed items from the area; he did not have 
permission to be in the parking lot or to remove items; he damaged the shed lock and 
hinges; and when security arrived, he fled. Tavenner has not challenged those facts and 
inferences on appeal. (See Br. of Appellant, 17-22, 24; see also id., 23-27). 
In addition, Tavenner has not disputed that he engaged in unlawful conduct: after 
all, the evidence shows he went to the restricted parking lot and removed items without 
permission; and he was seen leaving the area when security discovered damage to the 
shed. (See, e.g., id, 17, 18-19, 26-21 \ see also id., 19-20 n.l (referencing Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (2003) and this Court's authority to remand for "entry of a conviction 
on [an] included offense," if appropriate)). Yet those facts and inferences do not support 
that Tavenner made entry or went into the shed to commit theft or a felony for the 
burglary conviction. (See Br. of Appellant, 17-22, 23-24, 25-27); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-
6-202(1 )(a), (l)(b) (defining burglary); 76-6-201(4) (defining "[e]nter" to mean to intrude 
with a body part or object); 76-6-201(1) (giving the term "[b]uilding" "its ordinary 
meaning"). Thus, the evidence was insufficient.1 
1
 Even when the parties take into account the additional facts and inferences 
identified in Tavenner's opening brief (see Br. of Appellant, 17-22, 23-24, 25-27), the 
evidence fails to support that Tavenner entered the shed and removed items from it. For 
example, according to the evidence, maintenance worker Bryan Christensen checked the 
hazardous-waste shed on March 7 - more than 48 hours after it was damaged - and he 
determined that "things were removed because of the way [he] had stacked everything in 
there." (Br. of Appellant, 21-22 (citing R. 165:220); see also Br. of Appellee, 9 (citing R. 
165:219-20)). However, Christensen also acknowledged that hospital personnel did not 
7 
Although the State relies on State v. Hawkins, 967 P.2d 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), 
in its analysis (see Br. of Appellee, 25, 28), that case is distinguishable. In Hawkins, 967 
P.2d 966, the defendant did not dispute on appeal that he entered shop units owned by the 
Markhams. IcL at 970. However, he claimed he had permission and authority, and he 
claimed the State failed to show that entry was with criminal intent. See_ id_ at 970-71. 
Yet the evidence supported that defendant "came in the middle of the night and kicked in 
the door - damaging the premises." IcL at 971. That evidence together with entry into 
the units supported burglary. See, e.g., id. at 970-71. Also, the Court reiterated that 
evidence of criminal intent may be "inferred from circumstantial evidence: the manner of 
entry, the time of day, the character and contents of the building, the person's actions 
after entry, the totality of the surrounding circumstances, and the intruder's explanation." 
Id. at 972 (cites omitted). Thus, where entry was not an issue in Hawkins, the 
circumstances supported burglary. See_ id_; see also Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 20-23 
(identifying circumstantial evidence supporting criminal intent); State v. Burch, 413 P.2d 
805, 806 (Utah 1966) (ruling that evidence supported unlawful entry where window was 
provide security to the shed as seen in Exhibit 12 for approximately "a week-and-a-half 
or so" after it was damaged. (See R. 165:219; see also R. 164:113 (stating "maintenance 
facilities people" secured the shed sometime later after the lock and hinges were broken); 
164:134-35 (referencing State Exhibits 10-12 depicting the shed); 165:242-45 (stating 
health department agents investigated sometime later and saw the shed was "fortified")). 
In addition, according to Christensen, other employees were "takfing] care of waste" and 
would have access to the shed and the south side of the hospital from March 5 to March 
7. (See R. 165:224). Thus, based on the evidence, Christensen's observations on March 
7 do not support that on March 5, Tavenner took items from the shed. See State v. 
Shumwav, 2002 UT 124, fflf 16-18, 63 P.3d 94 (recognizing that officers failed to secure 
the scene after investigation, and others had access; thus, the evidence was insufficient to 
support that defendant tampered with evidence at the scene). 
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broken and defendant and a second person were apprehended in the building restroom). 
While the record here supports that Tavenner engaged in criminal conduct, that 
evidence is not enough. For burglary, it must support entry into a building. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-202(1 )(a), (l)(b). The State's evidence failed to support that element. (See 
Br. of Appellant, 15-16, 17-22, 23-24, 25). In addition, the State's argument for entry 
into the shed is speculative. (See, e.g., Br. of Appellee, 25; id_9 24 (stating "if [defendant] 
entered" the shed, "he did so unlawfully"; and "anyone unlawfully entering the shed" 
would have intent to remove hazardous waste) (emphasis added)). The conjecture 
demonstrates the weakness in the State's case: it asks this Court to take "a speculative 
leap across a remaining gap" in the evidence to sustain a conviction. Shumway, 2002 UT 
124, If 15. That is insufficient. The conviction for burglary should be reversed. 
(b) The Hazardous-Waste Counts. Next, the State charged Tavenner with two 
counts of transporting/disposing of hazardous waste. (R. 1-3). It was required to prove, 
inter alia, that Tavenner knowingly caused hazardous waste to be transported or disposed 
of without a plan or permit. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-113(3). Tavenner maintains that 
while the evidence supports he took unidentified items from an area near the hospital 
parking lot, it fails to support that he took hazardous waste, and it fails to link him to 
waste that health department agents found at a strip-mall dumpster several blocks away. 
(See, e.g., Br. of Appellant, 17-22, 23-24, 25- 27).2 The State seems to concede this 
2
 The State's case for burglary relied on a particular theory: that Tavenner entered/re-
mained inside the shed with intent to transport or to commit theft of hazardous waste. 
(See R. 104; 122; 124-25; 165:304-05). Thus, where the State's evidence failed to 
support the hazardous-waste counts, it likewise failed to support the State's theory for 
9 
point. It states, "even if Defendant did not 'enter' the shed," he took items from the area 
that could be "medical waste" or "ordinary trash from the garbage dumpster." (Br. of 
Appellee, 29). 
The State also claims that Tavenner cased the area for two nights to take medical 
waste, which has "value to individuals wanting drugs," including Tavenner (id., 30); he 
returned on March 5 to take items from the area; he fled when security arrived; he lied 
about taking items from the area; and health department agents found medical waste in a 
strip-mall dumpster "on a direct route from the hospital to Defendant's house." (Id.) 
According to the State, those facts and inferences support the convictions for hazardous-
waste crimes. Yet the State's argument requires the finder of fact to make inference upon 
inference, or to take speculative leaps across gaps in the evidence. Specifically, assuming 
Tavenner wanted pain medication, the State's argument for the convictions here would 
require the fact finder to speculate that Tavenner made entry into the hazardous-waste 
shed (but see supra, Argument B.l.(a)), took hazardous waste, and drove to the strip-mall 
dumpster to leave the waste. Yet there is no evidence that Tavenner did those things. 
(SeeBx. of Appellant, 16-17, 17-22, 23-24, 25-27). 
Moreover, "[o]ther reasonable explanations exist," Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ^  18, 
as to what Tavenner carried from the garbage dumpster and shed area to his car (i.e., 
"ordinary trash from the garbage dumpster" (Br. of Appellee, 29)); and other possibilities 
burglary, which relied on the hazardous-waste violations. See_ Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
202(1 )(a), (l)(b) (defining burglary as unlawfully entering into or remaining inside a 
building with intent to commit theft or a felony); (Br. of Appellant, 15-16, 22, 27). 
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exist for items found more than 18 hours later at a strip-mall dumpster, particularly since 
officers did not contain the shed after investigating the area early on March 5. (See, e.g., 
R. 164:132-44 (no indication that Wimmer secured the shed); 164:111-14 (Hughes testi-
fied the lock and hinges were damaged early on March 5); R. 165:219, 224 (Christensen 
stated the shed was repaired as seen in Exhibit 12 "a week-and-a-half' later, and others 
had access to the shed from March 5 to March 7); see also supra, note 1, herein). 
For example, a theory based on the incomplete evidence is that Tavenner wanted 
waste from the hospital so he went to the restricted lot on March 3, saw the dumpster, and 
returned on March 4 and 5 to load "ordinary trash" (Br. of Appellee, 29) from around the 
area into his car. Also, he damaged the shed to see what was there, but before he could 
open the shed door, security arrived, and he fled. 
In other cases, the Utah Supreme Court has refused to uphold a conviction where 
the evidentiary picture was incomplete. In State v. Shumway, the teenage defendant 
"slept over" at a friend's trailer home. 2002 UT 124, f^ 2. In the morning, he went to the 
friend's mother and woke her "by exclaiming that [the friend, Christopher,] had tried to 
stab him and that he stabbed Christopher back and thought that [Christopher] might be 
dead." IcL The mother found Christopher on the floor in the front room covered in 
blood, so she called 911. IcL Paramedics arrived and tried to revive him, but "declared 
him dead at the scene." IcL The officers then conducted a thorough investigation and 
collected several items of interest. IcL at ^[ 2, 15. The officers later cleared the scene 
without further securing it, and when the medical examiner determined that officers 
failed to retrieve the instrument that inflicted the fatal wound, the State charged the 
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defendant with tampering with evidence. See_ id at ^ 1-2, 15-16. 
On appeal, defendant maintained that due to gaps in the evidence, the State's case 
for tampering was insufficient. The Utah Supreme Court agreed; it rejected the State's 
claim that defendant concealed or disposed of the instrument. It stated the following: 
At most, the evidence supports only the proposition that [defendant] had the 
opportunity to destroy or conceal the second implement, if indeed it ever existed. 
As we wrote in State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993), "[a] guilty 
verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only 
remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." Other reasonable explanations exist 
why the instrument was not found. It could have fallen behind or underneath 
pieces of furniture in the living room where officers missed it in their search. It 
could have been found and discarded by the crime scene cleaners. Officers did not 
contact the crime scene cleaners after the clean-up to inquire whether they had 
found any such instrument. The journal entry is too terse and ambiguous to be 
reasonably relied upon. Only speculation supports the conviction. As we 
observed in \State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444-45 (Utah 1983)], while we review 
the evidence and all inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict, and 
stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as it will go, we cannot take a speculative leap 
across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. 
Shumway, 2002 UT 124, f^ 18 (emphasis in original). 
In addition, in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, superseded by rule on other grounds 
as stated in. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987), the supreme court reversed a 
murder conviction for insufficient evidence. It ruled the fabric of evidence against the 
defendant failed to prove guilt. Id_ In that case, the parties did not dispute the facts; 
rather, they disputed the inferences to be drawn from the facts. See id_ at 443. 
According to the evidence, a teenage girl, Phyllis Ady, was reported missing on 
December 13, 1977. IcL at 444. In July 1980, a person discovered her remains in the 
backyard of his rented home. IcL The evidence in the backyard supported that Phyllis 
"died from criminal activity." Id, In addition, defendant was the last person to see 
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Phyllis. M a t 445. They were the same age and went to school in Cedar City. IcL 
On the evening of December 12, 1977, Phyllis's aunt dropped her off at 
defendant's home. IcL When Phyllis did not return, the aunt went to defendant's house 
"but found no one there." IcL She went to defendant's home later and talked to him, but 
he did not know where Phyllis was. Id. 
Shortly after Phyllis's disappearance, the defendant left Cedar City. IcL 
According to the facts, on December 12, he called his sister in Las Vegas and told her "he 
was getting a hassle at home and in school and he wanted to come down." IcL He 
phoned again the next morning and his sister drove to Cedar City to take him to Las 
Vegas for four days. IcL The defendant made curious statements while in Las Vegas and 
again two years later. IcL He told his sister in Las Vegas that he had a nightmare about 
"walking with a girl and she slapped him and that's all he remembered, and then waking 
up taking a bath and her folks, the girl's folks pounding on the door wanting to know 
where she was." Id^ Also, he told his sister that "he thought he had hurt or killed a girl, 
but he wasn't sure." IcL at 446. The defendant's last statement related to the dream, and 
he described similar events in a dream to his brother and brother-in-law. IcL More than 
two years later, defendant told a girlfriend "that he had gotten into a fight with a girl in 
Utah," and "he had blood on his shirt; that was what was mentioned, and he couldn't 
remember nothing." IcL at 447 & n.4. 
The Utah Supreme Court considered the facts and inferences to be speculative. IcL 
at 447. They were insufficient to support the guilty verdict. IcL The court stated, 
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The verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree rests entirely on testimony 
of defendant's meeting Phyllis on the street on the evening she disappeared, his 
trip to Las Vegas on the day following, and on three witnesses' testimony of 
defendant's statements to them in Las Vegas. Interpreted most favorably to the 
prosecution, those statements refer entirely or almost entirely to defendant's 
descriptions of his strange dream. The testimony that he told a date two years later 
that he once had a fight with a girl in Utah adds nothing of substance on this issue. 
While the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the death of 
Phyllis Ady involved criminal activity (the corpus delicti), the evidence was not 
sufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant caused Phyllis 
Ady's death. Even if the evidence proved that defendant caused her death, it was 
manifestly insufficient to prove that he did so "intentionally or knowingly," as was 
charged in this complaint for murder in the second degree. 
IcL at 447 (cite omitted). 
The evidence in Tavenner's case is more remote and speculative than the evidence 
in Shumway and Petree. According to the evidence here, an officer obtained Tavenner's 
license plate number and address early on March 5. {See R. 164:137-39). However, 
"[o]fficers did not contact" {Shumway, 2002 UT 124, Tf 18) Tavenner to check his car (see 
R. 164:132-44 (Wimmer); 164:119-31 (McKnight); 164:147-66 (Stone)); or to inquire 
about waste found at the strip-mall dumpster blocks away. (See R. 164:132-44 
(Wimmer); 164:119-31 (McKnight); 164:147-66 (Stone)). 
Likewise, hospital personnel and "[o]fficers did not" (Shumway, 2002 UT 124, \ 
18) establish that anyone made entry into the shed on the morning of March 5 (see R. 
164:78-108 (Lutui); 164:118 (Hughes); see also R. 164:132-44 (Wimmer); 165:224-25 
(Bryan Christensen observed the shed for the first time on Monday (more than 48 hours 
later), and he acknowledged other workers would have had access to the shed over the 
weekend)); and they did not establish what, if anything, was missing from the area on 
March 5. (SeeR. 164:78-108 (Lutui); 164:109-118 (Hughes); 164:133, 142-43 
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(Wimmer)). 
"While the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude" (Petree, 659 P.2d at 
447) that approximately 18 hours after events at the hospital, agents discovered hazar-
dous waste at a strip mall several blocks west of the hospital and north of Tavenner's 
house, "[o]nly speculation supports" (Shumway, 2002 UT 124, f^ 18) a connection bet-
ween Tavenner and that waste. (See, e.g., Br. of Appellant, 16-17, 17-22, 23-24, 25-27). 
Moreover, since the burden of proving defendant's guilt remains on the state, the 
defendant is not required to disprove the State's case or to otherwise offer alternative 
theories for his innocence. See, e.g., Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^  19. That is, in the context 
of this case, the defendant is not required to explain how hazardous waste got to the strip-
mall dumpster. Thus, even where evidence supports that Tavenner engaged in unlawful 
conduct and took unidentified items from hospital property, "it was manifestly 
insufficient to prove" (quoting Petree, 659 P.2d at 447) that he entered the shed and took 
hazardous waste. On this record the convictions should be reversed. See_ State v. 
Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 12, 985 P.2d 911 (stating "[a]n appellate court should overturn a 
conviction" when the evidence is insufficient "as to each element of the crime charged"). 
2. Contrary to the State's Claims, Tavenner Marshaled the Eyidence 
The State claims Tavenner failed to marshal the evidence, and in connection with 
that claim, it has identified six "examples" where "Defendant fail[ed] to meet his mar-
shaling obligation." (Br. of Appellee, 23). The State's claims are erroneous. 
First, according to the State, Tavenner failed to "marshal Exhibit 55." (Br. of 
Appellee, 23 (emphasis in original)). That is incorrect for several reasons. Specifically, 
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the State presented "Exhibit 35" in rebuttal: after its case-in-diief, and after Tavenner 
testified. (SeeR. 165:286-88); see also State v. Kihlstrom. 1999 UT App 289, *h 9, 988 
P.2d 949 (stating evidence presented by defendant and by the prosecution in rebuttal is 
"not relevant" to the sufficiency analysis), cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). By 
relying on rebuttal evidence, the State seems to acknowledge here that its case-in-chief 
was insufficient to support the convictions. 
In addition, the contents of Exhibit 35 are inconclusive and immaterial. The 
exhibit shows Tavenner's activities on March 5 in the hospital parking lot, near the 
garbage dumpster and shed area. (See State Exhibit 35; see also Br. of Appellant, 17-22 
(marshaling evidence relating to Tavenner's activities on March 5)). Although the State 
provides a minute-by-minute summary of the exhibit contents (see Br. of Appellee, 26-
27), the State does not claim that the exhibit shows that Tavenner entered the shed for 
hazardous waste. (See id.). 
3
 As the State points out, Exhibit 35 contains clips from two separate video surveil-
lance cameras. (See Br. of Appellee, 26 & n 8). The first camera faces south and captures 
events in the south parking lot. (See State Exhibit 35, first video clip; see also R. 164:82, 
88). It depicts Tavenner driving into the lot on March 5, and parking at the curb. (See 
State Exhibit 35, first video clip at 1:32:03, right screen). The hazardous-waste shed and 
garbage dumpster are not visible in the first video clip. (Id., first video clip; see also R. 
164:102). 
The second camera is mounted on an exterior wall at the north end of a sidewalk 
under a covered loading dock; the camera faces south. (See State Exhibit 35, second 
video clip). The sidewalk at the north end of the dock can be seen in the top photo of 
State Exhibit 12, attached as Addendum A. The photographer in Exhibit 12 is facing 
north. The photo depicts the shed on the west side of the walk, and a garbage dumpster 
and a gray bin on the east side of the walk. (See State Exhibit 12). The sidewalk in 
Exhibit 12 begins at the south parking lot and continues under the covered loading dock. 
(See State Exhibit 12; see also State Exhibit 33, attached as Addendum B (depicting 
16 
Moreover, Tavenner does not dispute that on March 5, he did the things depicted 
in State Exhibit 35: he parked in the hospital south parking lot, took unidentified items 
from the area, and was in the area of the shed when the lock and hinges were damaged. 
(Br. of Appellant, 18-20, 22, 23, 24, 26; see also id., 19-20 n.l (referencing Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-402(5) and this Court's authority to remand the case for "entry of a 
conviction on [an] included offense," if appropriate)). 
Given Tavenner5s acknowledgements, the exhibit's relevance under the 
marshaling standard is dubious: it does not contain evidence that Tavenner "resists" on 
appeal. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1315 (stating under the marshaling standard, the 
appellant must present "every scrap of competent evidence" supporting "the very 
findings the appellant resists" (emphasis added)); see also Chen, 2004 UT 82, ^ 77 
(same); Neelv v. Bennett 2002 UT App 189, \ 11, 51 P.3d 724. 
Second, the State claims Tavenner failed to marshal arguments that defense 
hospital building, south parking lot, and a sidewalk that begins at the parking lot and 
continues north)). 
From the view of the second camera, the loading dock is straight ahead continuing 
south, and the terminal for trucks is on the west side of the walk (State Exhibit 35, second 
video clip, right screen). The hazardous-waste shed is also on the west side and is beyond 
the terminal for the trucks. (See State Exhibit 12 (depicting shed on the west side (left 
frame), loading dock beyond the shed, and loading terminal for trucks west of the dock)). 
The hazardous-waste shed is not visible in the second video clip. (See State Exhibit 35, 
second video clip; R. 164:102). Likewise, it is not behind the garbage dumpster. (See, 
e.g.. State Exhibit 12 (showing shed on the west side of the sidewalk, and the dumpster 
on the east side of the walk); see also Br. of Appellee, 26 (mistakenly saying the "hazar-
dous waste shed is behind the dumpster")). The garbage dumpster is seen in the second 
video clip on the left side of the sidewalk (east side), left screen. (State Exhibit 35, 
second video clip). The second video clip shows unspecified sporadic activity between 
1:33:24 and 1:39, behind the dumpster, on the east side of the sidewalk, at the top of the 
video screen, left of center. (State's Exhibit 35, second video clip, at 1:33:24 to 1:39). 
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counsel made during trial. {See Br. of Appellee, 23 (citing 164:75-77; 165:308-13)). Yet 
under Utah law, an appellant is not required to marshal arguments since they do not 
constitute evidence. See, e.g.. State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989) 
(identifying trial attorney's statements as "mere predications"; and finding favor with a 
jury instruction stating, "[Y]ou may not consider as evidence statements of the attorneys 
or any hint or intimation of the truth or falsity of any fact or evidence made by the 
attorneys"). 
Moreover, according to the record, trial counsel argued that no one witnessed 
Tavenner enter the shed (see R. 164:76; see also R. 165:311 ("nobody witnessed a break 
in or dumping"; witnesses "couldn't see where the items were coming from")); no one 
identified items taken from hospital grounds (R. 164:76; see also 165:311); and the 
State's evidence did "little or nothing to connect the dots" and left gaps. (R. 164:77; R. 
165:313 (stating evidence raises other explanations)). Thus, the State's claims about 
marshaling counsel's arguments are misplaced. 
Third, the State claims Tavenner failed to "acknowledge that he fled" when 
security arrived on March 5. (Br. of Appellee, 23). That is incorrect for several reasons. 
Specifically, Tavenner has acknowledged that he left the parking lot on March 5 when 
security arrived. (See Br. of Appellant, 19). Thus, he does not "resist[]" that fact. See, 
e.g., West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1315 (stating under the marshaling standard, the 
appellant must present "every scrap of competent evidence" supporting "the very 
findings the appellant resists" (emphasis added)); see also Chen, 2004 UT 82, ][ 77; 
Neely, 2002 UT App 189, \ 11. 
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Moreover, Tavenner has acknowledged on appeal that he engaged in unlawful 
conduct in the hospital parking lot. (See e.g., Br. of Appellant, 17, 22-26 (acknowledging 
he was in the parking lot, took unidentified items, and was in the area of the damaged 
shed); icL, 19-20 n.l (referencing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) and this Court's 
authority to remand the case for "entry of a conviction on [an] included offense," if 
appropriate)). While evidence of flight may support a guilty conscience for unlawful 
conduct, see. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 23, the evidence does not support an element of an 
offense at issue here; flight is not an element of burglary or the hazardous-waste crimes. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202(l)(a), (l)(b) (defining burglary); 19-6-113(3) (defining 
hazardous-waste crimes). 
In that regard, the flight evidence is inconclusive. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 
U.S. 471, 483 n.10 (1963) (doubting the probative value of flight evidence); State v. 
Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah 1983) (stating "the idea that flight constitutes an 'implied 
admission5 of guilt is not supported by any federal or state decision or by any of the 
analysis justifying flight instructions"5); see also State v. Riggs, 1999 UT App 271, ffl[ 11-
14, 987 P.2d 1281 (recognizing that evidence of flight relates to a lesser-included 
offense), abrogated on different grounds as stated in State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, 144 
P.3d 1096; Fisher v. Trapv, 748 P.2d 204, 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (stating evidence of 
flight may have indicated "fear or remorse just as easily as consciousness of guilt55); State 
v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579, 580 & n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing there may be 
reasons for flight consistent with innocence, and guilt inferred from flight may not 
necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged). 
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Fourth, the State claims Tavenner "fail[ed] to acknowledge" in his brief that his 
statements and testimony at trial were false. (Br. of Appellee, 23). Yet Tavenner was not 
required on appeal to marshal his statements. See, e.g.. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 
1315 (stating an appellant must marshal evidence for "the very findings" he "resists"); 
Chen, 2004 UT 82, lj 77 (same); Neely, 2002 UT App 189, % 11; see also Kihlstrom, 1999 
UT App 289, Tj 9 (stating "evidence presented by the defendant" is "not relevant" to the 
sufficiency inquiry). He does not dispute that his statements were conflicting, evasive, 
and unbelievable. (See Br. of Appellant, 23-24 (recognizing statements were "evasive 
and conflicting")). Likewise, he does not dispute that the evidence supports unlawful 
conduct. (See Br. of Appellant, 18-20, 22, 23, 24, 26 (evidence shows he parked his car 
in the restricted lot, took items, and was in the area of the damaged shed); see also id, 
19-20 n.l (referencing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) and remand for "entry of a 
conviction on [an] included offense," if appropriate)). 
Moreover, witness credibility is an issue exclusively for the jury. Mead, 2001 UT 
58, f 67 (stating it is the "exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to 
determine the credibility of the witnesses" and an appellate court does not sit as a second 
trier of fact). In that regard, appellants are not required to marshal witness credibility; 
indeed, they are not required to marshal unbelievable testimony since it likely was dis-
regarded by the finder of fact. See, e.g., State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, ^ f 40, 52 P.3d 
1194 (stating under the sufficiency analysis, the court will "assume that the jury believed 
the evidence that supports the verdict"); see also United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting 
Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ^  26, 140 P.3d 1200 (stating the marshaling 
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standard is not served if the parties "simply provid[e] an exhaustive review of all 
evidence presented at trial" (cite omitted)). Since Tavenner's lack of credibility is not an 
element of burglary or the hazardous-waste offenses (see Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-
202(1 )(a), (l)(b); 19-6-113(3)), it is not pertinent under the marshaling standard. 
Fifth, the State claims Tavenner "does not acknowledge that no one but Defendant 
was near the shed at the time of the burglary." (Br. of Appellee, 23). That claim is in-
correct: Tavenner has acknowledged on appeal that he was near the hospital garbage 
dumpster and shed removing unidentified items from the area, and he has acknowledged 
he was in the area when the lock and hinges were damaged. (See, e.g., Br. of Appellant, 
18-19, 22). As reflected in the Brief of Appellant, Tavenner does not "resist[J" or 
challenge those facts on appeal. See West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1315 (stating an 
appellant must marshal evidence for "the very findings" he "resists"); see also Chen, 
2004 UT 82, If 77 (same); Neely, 2002 UT App 189, % 11. 
Finally, the State claims Tavenner failed to acknowledge that the strip-mall 
dumpster was on a route between the hospital and his house. (Br. of Appellee, 24). Yet 
in this case, Tavenner does not "resistf]" or challenge those facts on appeal. West Valley 
City, 818 P.2d at 1315 (stating an appellant must marshal evidence for "the very 
findings" he "resists"); see also Chen, 2004 UT 82, ^  77 (same); Neely, 2002 UT App 
189, T[ 11; (Br. of Appellant, 24 (citing State Exhibit 14)). 
Moreover, pursuant to the marshaling requirement, after pointing out those facts in 
his brief, Tavenner then "ferret[ed] out the fatal flaw." See_ West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 
1315. That is, the evidence showing the location of Pioneer Valley Hospital, Tavenner's 
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home, and the strip-mall dumpter is inconclusive. (See Br. of Appellant, 24, 26-27). The 
evidence leaves gaps requiring the jury to speculate about the matter. (See id; see also 
supra. Argument B. 1 .(b), herein). Without something more to link Tavenner to the strip 
mall or the items found at the dumpster there, the evidence is remote and in doubt. See, 
e.g., Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ^ 18; Petree, 659 P.2d at 447; (see also Br. of Appellant, 
24, 26-27; supra, Argument B.l.(b), herein). 
In the end, the State has failed to cite to any facts to support that Tavenner made 
entry into a building or that he took hazardous waste from the hospital parking lot. 
Likewise, the State has failed to identify any facts to support that Tavenner had anything 
to do with waste that was found later in a strip-mall dumpster, several blocks from his 
home. On this record, the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. 
C. THE ERROR HERE WAS OBVIOUS. 
As a final argument, the State seems to claim that even where evidence is 
insufficient for a conviction, the error may not have been obvious to the trial court where 
defense counsel presented arguments to the jury, or where defendant presented unbe-
lievable statements at trial. (See Br. of Appellee, 31). The State's argument is incorrect. 
As stated supra, the defendant's case to the jury and his lack of credibility at trial 
did not relieve the State of its burden to prove each element of the offense. (See supra, 
Argument A., herein). In addition, defense counsel's arguments to the jury here did not 
relieve the State of its burden. In fact, defense counsel argued that no one witnessed 
Tavenner enter the shed (see R. 164:76; see also R. 165:311 ("nobody witnessed a break 
in or dumping"; witnesses "couldn't see where the items were coming from")); no one 
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identified items taken from hospital grounds (R. 164:76; see also 165:311); and the 
State's evidence did "little or nothing to connect the dots" and left gaps. (R. 164:77; see 
also R. 165:313 (stating evidence raises other explanations)). 
In the event the trial court somehow believed that defense counsel's arguments 
would suffice for criminal elements, or defendant's unbelievable statements at trial would 
relieve the State of its burden of proof, the court was plainly and obviously mistaken. 
(See, e.g., R. 110 (reflecting the trial court's own instruction to the jury that "[w]hat the 
lawyers say is not evidence"); 113-14 (reflecting the trial court's own instruction to the 
jury on the prosecution's burden of proof)); see also Spillers, 2007 UT 13, f^ 19 (stating 
the burden of proof "remains on the state, whether defendant offers any evidence in an 
effort to prove affirmative defenses or not" (cite omitted)); Reyes, 2005 UT 33, ]f 11 
(stating the prosecutor's burden is of "constitutional status"); Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 13 
(stating, "[a]t bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit us to avoid injustice" 
(cite omitted)); Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (2003) (requiring trial court to discharge 
defendant when the evidence is insufficient); (supra, Argument A., herein). 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has stated in some instances, it may be 
"difficult" on appeal to dictate when an evidentiary defect should be apparent to a trial 
court under the plain-error standard; however, at a certain point, "an evidentiary 
insufficiency is so obvious and fundamental that it would be plain error for the trial court 
not to discharge the defendant. An example is the case in which the State presents no 
evidence to support an essential element of a criminal charge. The plain error exception 
would serve to avoid a manifest injustice in such a case." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 17 
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(emphasis added). This is such a case. Based on a review of the record, the insufficient 
evidence resulted in plain error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and as stated in the Brief of Appellant, Bryan 
Tavenner respectfully requests that this Court reverse the convictions. 
SUBMITTED this /& day of ^e^hm)f)^r , 2008. 
Linda M. Jones 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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